What this analysis reveals is that the most important policy lessons to be gleaned from the U.S. experience with controlling ostensibly "unwanted" immigration over the last decade are negative ones. Thus far, there is no evidence that a tripling of border enforcement resources has created an effective deterrent to unauthorized immigration, while significant "unintended" consequences abound. Why a failed strategy of immigration control persists, despite the steady accumulation of evidence demonstrating its low efficacy, is another key question, addressed in the conclusion.
During the 1990s, more than 11 million people were added to the U.S. population through immigration. As a percentage of total population, the foreign-born were still smaller at the end of the 20
th Century than at the beginning of it, but in absolute terms the growth of the immigrant population in the 1990s was unprecedented. That robust growth has continued into the current decade: Nearly 1.5 million immigrants are being added to the U.S. population each year, and according to an estimate by the Urban Institute, at least one-third of that net growth -about 500,000 per year --is unauthorized (Passel, Capps, and Fix 2004) . 1 But how much of this immigration is truly "unwanted," and how much is the inevitable outcome of a set of policies and incentives that generate illegality? Any assessment of the effectiveness and consequences of U.S. immigration control measures must begin by addressing the issue of intentionality.
Public opinion survey data consistently have shown that the American public does not want an expansionary immigration policy, but neither do they want to slam the door. In one recent national survey, nearly half (49 percent) of Americans expressed a preference for a lower level of immigration, compared with 14 percent who would like to see immigration increased; the remaining 33 percent favored the present level (Saad 2004) . In another survey, a plurality (46 percent) of Americans believed that "immigrants are having a bad influence on the way things are going" in the United States. But nearly as many (42 percent) thought that immigrants were having a beneficial impact, while more than one of ten respondents had no opinion. 2 When asked, in another survey, to choose between the statements that "Immigrants today strengthen our country because of their hard work and talents" and "Immigrants today are a burden on our country because they take our jobs, housing, and health care," respondents split evenly: each statement was endorsed by 47 percent, with 6 percent undecided (National Public Radio et al.
2004). President Bush's proposal in January 2004 to establish a new temporary foreign worker
program did not win majority support, but neither was there much support for alternatives to the Bush plan, suggesting a lack of consensus in the general public on what should be done to reform the U.S. immigration system (National Public Radio et al. 2004: Q. 55; Newport 2004 ).
All this does not amount to a clear mandate for a significantly more restrictive policy.
Moreover, there are notable contradictions in the public's belief system about the consequences of immigration. For example, most Americans believe that immigration hurts the economy by driving wages down and causing unemployment among native-born workers. But majorities of Americans interviewed in national surveys conducted since 1995 thought that immigrants only take jobs that citizens refuse. 3 Thus, the U.S. public does not perceive significant, direct competition between immigrants and native-born workers in the labor market. It appears that Americans, however grudgingly, recognize the essential role of immigrant labor in the 2 National sample of 1,000 residents of the United States, interviewed by Ipsos/Associated Press, May 7-17, 2004. 3 Ibid.; Espenshade and Belanger (1998) ; National Public Radio et al. (2004) .
functioning and growth of the economy. They continue to hire foreign-born migrant workersauthorized and unauthorized--for their businesses and homes, even during periods of recession. 4 Finally, the salience of the immigration issue to the average American tends to be very low.
In national surveys that ask about the main problems that government should be addressing, no more than 1-2 percent of interviewees typically mention immigration as the most important problem facing the country -about the same percentage as those who respond "don't know."
Thus, anti-immigration sentiment in the United States is broad but not very deep. 5 Only when immigration policy is placed overtly in the context of post-9/11 anti-terrorism efforts, or when there is a well-organized campaign to whip up support for anti-immigration ballot measures, 6 does the issue seem to arouse the interest of the average American.
Current U.S. immigration control policy reflects both the low salience of the issue and the ambivalence of general public attitudes toward recent immigrants, especially those who are perceived as "needed workers." The U.S. strategy -quite intentionally, in the view of many critics --addresses only the supply side: the flow of unauthorized migrants; it does nothing serious to reduce employer demand for immigrant labor. A supply-side-only strategy inevitably fails to deter "unwanted" immigration from Mexico and other Third World countries, while further entrenching unauthorized workers in the U.S. labor force. 4 For evidence from employer interviews on continued recruitment of Mexican migrant workers during recent recessions in the United States, see Calavita (1990) and Cornelius (1998) . 5 The relatively low salience of immigration as a public policy issue in the United States is a consistent finding of survey-based research (see Espenshade and Belanger 1998) . Interestingly, in Western Europe the immigration issue appears to be more salient (and elicits greater negativity) among elites than the general public; the opposite is true in the United States (see results of national surveys conducted in May-July 2002 by the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations, posted at: http://www.worldviews.org/detailreports/usreport/html/ch5s5.html; and Lahav (2004: 84-86) .
6 Such campaigns, heavily financed by national-level anti-immigration advocacy groups, led to the passage of "direct democracy" ballot initiatives in California (Proposition 187, in 1994) and Arizona (Proposition 200, in 2004 ) that sought to bar unauthorized immigrants from receiving most state-funded social services.
A Border-Centered Strategy of Immigration Control
One of the paradoxes of recent U.S. history is that the explosive growth of unauthorized immigration has been occurring at a time when the United States was spending considerably more on immigration control than ever before, especially on border enforcement. The U.S.
Congress has quintupled spending for border enforcement activities since 1993, to $3.8 billion in FY 2004, and tripled the size of the Border Patrol, to more than 11,000 agents (see Figure 1 ).
The border enforcement build-up originated in early 1993, when the White House staff began searching for a way to inoculate President Clinton against the anti-immigration backlash that had emerged in California in the early 1990s. That movement had secured the reelection of Republican Gov. Pete Wilson and the resounding approval of Proposition 187, the voter initiative that would have excluded undocumented immigrant children from the public schools and blocked them and their parents from using virtually all other public services, had it not been struck down several years later by the federal courts on grounds of unconstitutionality (Ono and Sloop 2002, Magaña 2003 ). Clinton's advisors believed that a highly visible show of force on the border would neutralize Republican criticism of lax immigration control in the run-up to the 1996 presidential election. Accordingly, the administration began spending unprecedented amounts of money on border enforcement.
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Rather than spreading out the new resources all along the southwest border, a decision was made to concentrate them on four relatively short segments of the border. Thus was born the 7 Harvard Law School faculty member Christopher Edley, a member of the U.S. Commission on Human Rights who participated in the formulation of the Clinton administration's immigration policy, recalled the circumstances that gave rise to the Administration's unprecedented build-up of border enforcement resources beginning in early 1993. The White House perceived a "crisis" in the area of refugee control, with Haitians and Chinese asylum-seekers threatening to arrive in overwhelming numbers. At the same time, a groundswell of anti-immigrant sentiment was developing in the U.S. Congress and in the state of California, which was crucial to the President's reelection in 1996. Accordingly, a decision was made to "put as much money into the INS as they could plausibly absorb. authorities simply assumed that no one would risk their lives trying to navigate around and through these extreme natural hazards.
The first step in fortifying the main gates was to erect a 10-foot-high steel fence to inhibit illegal entry through the San Diego and El Paso urban areas. This "primary" fence was built by welding together corrugated steel landing mats left over from the Vietnam War and stored in government warehouses. 9 The primary fence in the San Diego sector ends in the Pacific Ocean,
where Zodiac rafts patrol to discourage unauthorized migrants from swimming or wading around the fence. Migrants and professional smugglers constantly probe for the weak points in the primary fence. It is possible to dig under the fence; fourteen trans-border tunnels used to smuggle migrants, drugs, or both were discovered along the California-Mexico border in a three-year have not yet been heavily fortified. 10 Along most of the 350 miles of border in the state of Arizona, the only man-made barrier is a few strands of wire strung on 3-foot-high metal poles.
There is regular shuttle-van service connecting small staging towns, like Altár in northern Sonora, to popular crossing points on the Arizona border, like Sasábe. The most heavily-used trails through the desert are patrolled, however, and many migrants are apprehended before they get to their pick-up point, which can be 20-40 miles inside the United States.
Another technological enhancement of the post-1993 strategy of border enforcement is the IDENT system, a computerized data base that in which the photo, fingerprints, and other personal identifying information on each apprehended illegal migrant are entered. The Border Patrol says that it uses this technology to spot migrants who are egregious recidivists, who are presumed to be professional people-smugglers rather than ordinary migrants. 11 But fewer than 4 percent of apprehended migrants are actually detained and prosecuted for illegal entry, partly because it costs $90 a day to keep them in detention facilities and bed space is very limited. For the rest, if they are willing to sign a form attesting that they are voluntarily repatriating themselves, migrants are simply bused to a gate on the border, where they reenter Mexico. Such "voluntarily repatriated" migrants typically are in custody for only a few hours.
Data collected by the Border Patrol using the IDENT system show that the recidivism rate among apprehended migrants has risen in recent years (Table 1 ). This trend has been interpreted by immigration authorities as evidence of the efficacy of the concentrated border enforcement strategy, but that would be so only if repeat crossers were being discouraged after multiple apprehensions and returning to their places of origin. There is, however, no evidence that the higher probability of apprehension in heavily fortified corridors is having such an effect on migrants' behavior. The vast majority of apprehended migrants attempt to enter again the next evening or within a couple of days. People-smugglers typically give their clients three "free" tries, and most do not need more than one or two (Cornelius 1998 What do these fluctuations in apprehension statistics tell us about the actual flow of unauthorized migrants? 13 Falling apprehensions at the beginning of the current decade enabled the Border Patrol to assert that it had turned the enforcement corner, due to greater resources and 12 Returning to the border by air from Oaxaca (via Mexico City) cost U.S. $215 in December 2004 -the equivalent of only three or four days' wages from a U.S. job. 13 The number of apprehensions is a highly imperfect but still useful indicator of the volume of unauthorized migrants entering the country. Apprehension statistics may either understate or overstate the actual flow owing to changes in Border Patrol apprehension tactics and resources, repeat entries by the same migrants (as shown in Table 1 above, the number of discrete individuals is considerably lower than the number of apprehension events), and the large but unknowable number of migrants who escape detection completely and proceed to their destinations in the U.S. interior. The "get-away" ratio traditionally has been estimated by Border Patrol officials at 2:1 or 3:1, but there is no scientific basis for this guess-timate. Border Patrol officers count the footprints left behind by migrants crossing the border and compare these counts with the number of apprehensions made during each shift to gauge the number of migrants who enter without detection.
more efficient performance by agents in the field (Martin 2004: 84) . A more plausible interpretation is that apprehensions rose in the late 1990s because migrants and people-smugglers were still learning how to evade the new obstacles, but by the end of Fiscal Year 2001 that learning process was complete and the probability of apprehension once again began to decline.
Furthermore, after eight years the concentrated border enforcement strategy had raised the financial costs and physical risks of illegal entry to the point that undocumented migrants were staying longer on each trip they made to the United States or settling permanently there. 14 Data from surveys of Mexican migrants in transit or returning from the U.S. document these trends.
Both legal and illegal migrants were staying longer in the United States in the late 1990s, but the sojourns of unauthorized migrants were especially extended. 15 In 1992 This analysis of trends necessarily is speculative, because we lack recent data gathered in migrant-sending communities about how the border enforcement build-up is affecting migration decisions. However, the weight of the evidence from various kinds of sources is that tougher 14 Focus groups with Mexican undocumented immigrants in California conducted by the Public Policy Institute of California also revealed that many people were staying in the U.S. longer in hopes of legalizing their status, so as to be able move back and forth freely without the cost and risk of clandestine entry (Reyes 2004: 315-19) .
15 Encuesta sobre Migración en la Frontera Norte de México (EMIF), El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, Consejo Nacional de Población, Secretaría de Trabajo y Previsión Social, Instituto Nacional de Migración, 7 Fases (1993 -2002 . For further evidence of longer stays and greater permanence in the United States as border enforcement tightened in the second half of the 1990s, see Massey, Durand, and Malone (2002: 128-133) and Reyes (2004) .
border enforcement has been much more effective in bottling up unauthorized migrants inside the U.S. than in deterring them from coming in the first place. 16 It should be noted that stepped-up border enforcement is not the only factor that has contributed to the rapid growth of the unauthorized immigrant population in the United States in recent years. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, many aliens of various nationalities who were in the United States legally on temporary visas over-stayed them, out of fear that they might not be allowed to reenter if they returned to their home country. significantly higher levels of manpower and technology, the current strategy may eventually produce some of the anticipated results, but the time frame for effectiveness is highly uncertain, and it is equally possible that ratcheting up investment in this strategy will yield only an intensification of the trends observable during the last ten years.
Policy Alternatives
Several Most U.S. employers of unauthorized migrants pay them at least the legal minimum wage, and both the employers and the workers regularly pay taxes on their earnings; therefore, the only violation of the law is hiring immigrants who lack proper work authorization. Prosecution of such "victimless" white collar crime -giving jobs to needy immigrants -has never been a priority of U.S. law enforcement agencies and courts (see Calavita 1990) . Finally, individual homeowners do not have to worry about immigration law enforcement, despite the fact that they provide a large share of the jobs that go to unauthorized migrants in the United States --house cleaning, child care, elder care, gardening, small construction jobs, and so forth. There is no government effort whatsoever to crack down on this widespread form of unauthorized immigrant employment.
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To reduce the magnet of U.S. jobs, more vigorous worksite enforcement aimed at larger employers would have to be coupled with systematic efforts to remove unauthorized immigrants found to be employed by such firms from the labor market and the country. Absent such "removal" efforts, targeted workplace enforcement simply scatters unauthorized workers to other employers and industries. For example, in 1998 immigration authorities investigated 103 meatpacking plants in the state of Nebraska -a concentrated enforcement effort dubbed Operation Vanguard. Some 4,500 immigrant workers (17 percent of the total work force) were found to have used questionable Social Security numbers in applying for their job. Immigration agents selected 3,135 of these workers to be interviewed, but 2,149 (69 percent) quit their jobs subcontractors as after-hours cleaning crew workers. Senior Wal-Mart executives denied any knowledge of the hiring practices of the company's subcontractors.
before agents arrived at the workplace. Only 1,040 workers were interviewed, and in the end only 34 unauthorized workers were arrested and expelled from the country (Martin 1999) .
Complaints by employer groups, community organizations, local politicians, and members of Another approach is to restrict migrants' access to public services in order to deter illegal entry and over-staying. This is the approach to immigration control that the state of California tried to implement in the 1990s. Governor Pete Wilson argued that once all public services were cut off illegal immigrants would "self-deport" and that those considering migration to California would be deterred. This logic was embedded in the Wilson-backed Proposition 187, approved by 59 percent of the California electorate in 1994. The initiative's basic premise was demonstrably false: there was no direct, scientifically reliable evidence to support the notion that appreciable numbers of migration decisions were being influenced by the availability of public services in California. But the passage of Proposition 187 generated sufficient fear and confusion in the immigrant community that parents stopped taking their children to public health care clinics. They did not "self-deport," but they did avoid using services to which their U.S.-born children were fully entitled.
The U.S. welfare reform law of 1996 had similar consequences. Inspired by California's Proposition 187, this federal law made not only unauthorized immigrants but legal permanent resident ineligible for virtually all federally-funded benefits, like food stamps and Medicaid, until they had lived in the U.S. for at least five years. Welfare reform stimulated no mass exodus of unauthorized migrants, and there was no let-up in the massive wave of new immigration occurring in the second half of the 1990s. But immigrant parents whose children were eligible for benefits did not access them because of confusion and fear of disclosing information about themselves to the authorities. About three-quarters of all children living in immigrant-headed households in the United States are U.S. citizens, and there was a significant decline in benefit use by such families in the latter half of the 1990s (Singer 2004: 31) . In short, restricting access to public services has proven to be a very blunt instrument of immigration control; it creates major social problems, and it does not discourage illegal immigration.
Legalizing the migration flow to the greatest extent possible is another option. The United All such programs share a basic conceptual flaw, i.e., the lack-of-fit between a temporary worker program and the needs and preferences of migrant workers and their employers. Even among Mexican nationals, who have a multi-generational history of short-term labor migration to the U.S., fewer than one out of ten now employed in the United States is working in agriculture or some other seasonal job. 24 Because of technological changes, even agricultural jobs increasingly are year-round. Rotating temporary workers through permanent jobs is simply not sound policy, and it invites non-compliance with the terms of the program by both migrants and employers. Such a policy is politically expedient, however, since hardly any politician wants to acknowledge that there are permanent jobs in an advanced industrial economy that cannot be filled with native-born workers.
From a public policy perspective, it would be preferable to move directly to a sizable increase in permanent-resident visas ("green cards") to accommodate foreign workers and employers in labor-intensive industries. That option would provoke much stronger political resistance than a temporary worker program but it is likely to yield better long-term results, by giving migrants who are de facto permanent additions to the labor force a better platform for upward mobility and social integration. But the United States has studiously avoided this route.
Approximately 100,000 visas are issued each year to low-skilled temporary foreign workers in all occupational categories (the largest number to agricultural workers), but only 10,000
permanent resident visas are allocated each year to low-skilled foreign workers, based on their occupation rather than family ties, representing only 6 percent of the total allocation of permanent resident visas. Aggregate U.S. employer demand for low-skilled foreign workers is greater than for high-skilled foreigners, to whom nearly 200,000 temporary visas were granted in 2002, but that labor-market reality is not reflected in the U.S. immigration system. Thus, much of the illegality in low-skilled employment today is "manufactured" illegality: a direct function of unrealistically low quotas for low-skilled foreign workers, quotas that are set so low for political rather than market-based reasons.
In the long run, the most effective approach to immigration control would be to create alternatives to emigration by stimulating job-creating development in key migrant-sending areas.
In the case of Mexico, we know precisely where such efforts would need to be targeted: the 
Conclusion: Why Does a Failed Policy Persist?
While there is rising criticism from both the political left and the right that the U.S. system of immigration control is "broken," it is striking that the proposals for "comprehensive reform" Third, and most importantly, the U.S. economy in the 21 st Century has an insatiable appetite for immigrant labor --much of it low-skilled --which is not satisfied by existing laws and policies. Accordingly, the number of stakeholders in a de facto expansionary immigration policy is very large and continues to grow. This is reflected in the ambivalence of U.S. public opinion concerning immigration. The average American may object to large-scale immigration (at least from Mexico and other "undesirable" source countries) because it increases cultural diversity or tax burdens, but he recognizes the labor market realities and economic functions of immigration.
The convergence of these factors makes it quite unlikely that a consensus will develop, anytime soon, on what should replace existing U.S. immigration control policies. The absence of consensus on alternatives locks in the current policy mix, under which unauthorized immigrants bear most of the costs and risks of "control" while benefits flow impressively to employers and consumers. 25 Promised future experiments with guest worker programs, highly secure ID cards for verifying employment eligibility, and new technologies for electronic border control are unlikely to change this basic dynamic. 
